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THE REMOVAL POWER OF THE PRESIDENT AND INDEPENDENT
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
"Beyond the cabinet there stretched
the Executive Branch of the Govern-
ment--an. endless thicket of vested
usage and vested interest, apportion-
ed among a number of traditional
jurisdictions. . . This was, in the
popular understanding, the govern-
ment of the United States..
REGINALD PARKERt
The President's constitutional position as the chief executive has
been outlined elsewhere.' We shall now attempt to delineate his powers
in relation to the other administrative officers and agencies.
George Washington started the practice of consulting with the "prin-
cipal Officer in each of the executive Departments,"2 which soon came to
be called "the President's Cabinet."3  This term, however, as well as the
institution behind it is of no legal relevance. Presidents may consult
with anybody if they so desire and they may have a permanent adviser,
like President Wilson's Colonel House, or an entire "brain trust" of ad-
visers, on or off the governmental payroll, without violating any written
or unwritten law. On the other hand, the President need not seek any-
body's advice, either from the cabinet or any of its individual members.'
Unlike under foreign constitutions, there are no matters that must be
This article is the substance of a chapter of the author's forthcoming book,
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE, scheduled to be published by Little, Brown & Co.
* SCHLESINGER, THE COMING OF THE NEW DEAL 520-21 (1959).
f Professor of Law, Willamette University.
1. Parker, The President as The Head of the Executive-Administrative Hierarchy:
A Survey, 8 J. PUB. L. 437 (1959). FENNO, THE PRESIDENT'S CABINET (1959).
2. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
3. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 82-3 (4th ed. 1957); THE CON-
STITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 20-1, 104 (11th ed. 1954) ; FENNO, op. cit. supra
note 1; LAsm, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, AN INTERPRETATION 70-110 (1940);
SWISHER, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 62-3 (1943); KELLY AND HARBISON,
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION, ITS ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT 184 (1948); MILTON,
THE USE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER 29 (1944) ; Grundstein, Presidential Power, Admin-
istration and Administrative Law, 18 GEo. WASH. L. RPv. 285 (1950).
4. Thus the Opinions of the Attorney General are interpretations of the law not
binding on the President but merely persuasive by their usual objectivity, elaborateness,
and the fact that they come from the highest enforcement officer of judicial law. See
Toepfer, Some Legal Aspects of the Duty of the Attorney General to Advise, 19 U. OF
CIN. L. REv. 201 (1950).
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disposed of by the President only upon advice or consent of the cabinet.
In short, the cabinet's functions are political and not capable of legal cog-
nition. This makes legally tenable Professor Schlesinger's terse observa-
tion that "American Presidents fall into two types: those who like to
make decisions and those who don't"' but rather delegate matters to their
officers.
This, however, does not mean that our constitutional system "knows
only 'one executive power,'" as Professor Corwin thinks.' On the con-
trary, the federal government is not organized as an ideal hierarchy.7
The American President is at the helm of "his" government in a rather
restricted sense.
Even where the Constitution clothes the President with a function
of supremacy, as in the case of his position as the commander of the army
and navy, the extent of his power is sometimes dohbtful s More often,
however, the grant of presidential power stems from a statute.' In that
case the enabling statute must be analyzed to determine his authority."0
And if, as is now the rule rather than the exception, a statute vests func-
tions in an administrative body or officer other than the President, that
agency and not the President is the bearer of the powers concerned. It
is the National Labor Relations Board and not the President that holds
union elections and decides (subject to judicial control, not relevant here)
which labor practices are unfair," and it is the Postmaster General, rather
5. SCHLESINGER, THE COMING OF THE NEV DEAL 527 (1959).
6. CORWIN, op. cit. supra note 3, at 84; Cole v. Young, 226 F.2d 337, 339-40 (D.C.
Cir. 1955). But see WALDo, THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE, 112 (1948); SCHLESINGER,
op. cit. supra note 5, at 511-73.
7. Aside from outright dictatorships, such an ideal hierarchy hardly exists
anywhere. The term "hierarchy" derives from the organization of the Church, but even
under canon law, a priest, for instance, may not be removed from office without specific
legal grounds as set forth in Codex Juris Canonici can. 2147-67. In other words, even
here subordinate organs cannot be freely interfered with from above.
8. Compare Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603 (1850) (President's
powers are that of a military commander in the strict sense), with It re Yamashita,
327 U.S. 1 (1946) (President may convene a military commission to punish war
criminals). See also Mason, itter Arma Silent Leges: Chief Justice Stone's Views,
69 HARv. L. Ruv. 806 (1956); PARKm, op. cit. supra note 1, at 448-53.
9. E.g., §§ 206-10 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 155 (1947),
29 U.S.C. §§ 176-80 (1958) (national emergency strikes); Selective Service Act, 62
Stat. 625 (1948), 50 U.S.C. App. § 468 (1958) (seizure of manufacturing plants failing
to produce goods for the Atomic Energy Commission) ; Tariff Act and Trade Agreement
Extension Act, 19 U.S.C. §§ 1001, 1364 (1958) (proclamation of tariffs) ; Federal Avia-
tion Act, 72 Stat. 782, 795 (1958), 49 U.S.C. §§ 1461, 1486 (1958) (licensing of foreign
air carriers).
10. Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line, Inc., 356 U.S. 309 (1958) ; Chicago & South-
ern Airlines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948); Carl Zeiss, Inc. v. United
States, 76 F. 2d 412 (C.C.P.A. 1935); Schmidt Pritchard & Co. v. United States, 167
F. Supp. 272 (Cust. Ct 1958). See also Cole v. Young, 226 F.2d 337 (D.C. Cir. 1955).
11. NLRA §§ 9-11, 61 Stat. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 159-61 (1958).
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than the chief executive, who determines what books are so "vile" as to
exclude them from the mails." The President "takes care" that the law
is enforced 3 but not that it be changed; and he may direct law enforce-
ment only when he is so authorized. 4 Legally speaking, he has no over-
all administrative authority.
Of course, to his statutory or constitutional law enforcing authority
must be added-quite aside from his psychological leadership as the na-
tion's political pacemaker-the President's most powerful way of in-
directly forcing his will upon the administrative branch of government:
his power of appointment and removal. The former, limited by the
necessity of the consent of the Senate, assures the President to a reason-
able extent that only persons who share his views on major questions will
hold executive posts and that dissenters will not be reappointed. It re-
quires no further discussion here. The latter works as a permanent, im-
plicit warning against the appointee to conform to the wishes of the
chief of state.
However, the presidential removal power is not unlimited. While
it is now established that, unlike the power to appoint, it is not subject to
the consent of the Senate, " it yet exists only where the removal does not
violate positive law. The terms of a cabinet member as well as of many
other agency heads are not statutorily established. It is therefore correct
to say that they hold their offices at the President's pleasure. 6 The
chiefs and members of some other agencies, on the other hand, hold of-
fice for a period of time that is fixed by statute. Can it be said then,
that unless the incumbent violates his official duties or commits a crime-
in short, if he does not "behave" in the sense of the old laws that have
established the tenure of English and American judgesT--he has a right
to stay in office until his term expires? The Supreme Court answered
this question in the affirmative in the case of Humphrey's Executors v.
United States.'s This decision rested largely on the quasi-judicial and
quasi-legislative nature of the Federal Trade Commission involved in the
particular lawsuit. This is unfortunate, not only because "quasi-judicial"
is a term of uncertain meaning, but mainly because the heads of the old-
12. 64 Stat. 451 (1950), 39 U.S.C. § 259 (1958). Cf. Summerfield v. Sunshine
Book Co., 221 F.2d 42 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 921 (1955).
13. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
14. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952); Schmidt,
Pritchard & Co. v. United States, 167 F. Supp. 272 (Cust. Ct. 1958); L. C. PARKER,
op. cit. supra note 1.
15. Myers v. United States, 272 U. S. 52 (1926).
16. Ibid.
17. 13 Will. 3, c. 2 (1701); 1 Geo. 3, c. 23 (1760); 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES.
267; U. S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
18. 295 U.S. 602 (1935). See also Wiener v. United State, 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
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line departments perform duties that are just as quasi-judicial or legisla-
tive as that of "independent" agencies. 9 Yet the case of Wiener v. United
States" has extended the Humphrey" rule to quasi-judicial agencies
whose members have no fixed statutory term. Wiener settles some ques-
tions concerning the removability without cause of agency heads, but it
raises and leaves unanswered other problems. A brief analysis of what
seems to be the present status of the law seems apposite.
The Humphrey case" held that the FCT:
is an administrative body created by Congress . . . to perform
• . . specified duties as a legislative or as a judicial aid. . . . Its
duties . . . must be free from executive control. In administer-
ing the provisions of the statute in respect to 'unfair methods
of competition' . . the commission acts in part quasi-
legislatively and in part quasi-judicially. . . . We think it plain
under the Constitution that illimitable power of removal is not
possessed by the President in respect of officers of the charac-
ter just named. The authority of Congress, in creating quasi-
legislative or quasi-judicial agencies.., cannot well be doubted;
and that authority includes . . . power to fix the period during
which they shall continue, and to forbid their removal .
in the meantime. For it is quite evident that one who holds
his office only during the pleasure of another, cannot be de-
pended upon to maintain an attitude . . . against the latter's
will."
The case involved a commissioner whose seven-year term had not ex-
pired. The decision rests in part on the power of Congress to establish
such a term.
Wiener 4 quotes Humphrey with approval and reiterates the latter's
strong dictum that the rule does not apply to "purely executive" officers.
The "President's inherent power to remove a postmaster, obviously an
executive official," cannot be doubted."
But Wiener goes a considerable step beyond Humphrey. In the
Humphrey case a statutorily fixed tenure of office was involved. The
Court could have rested its holding simply on this fact, quite regardless
of the "quasi-judicial" or "purely executive" functions of the official in-
19. See infra, text at note 31.
20. 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
21. 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
22. Ibid.
23. Id. at 628-29.
24. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
25. Id. at 351.
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volved. Mr. Wiener, on the other hand, was a member of a so-called
War Claims Commission which was to "adjudicate according to the
law"2 claims of former war prisoners, camp internees, and other per-
sons and organizations who had suffered damage at the hands of the
enemy during World War II. The Commission was intended to be of a
short duration. After its life had been extended two times, it was abol-
ished in 1954. "This limit on the Commission's life was the mode by
which the tenure of the Commissioners was defined, and Congress made
no provision for removal of a Commissioner."27
Does, then, the Wiener rule mean that every agency member of a
quasi-judicial agency with an undefined duration has lifetime tenure?
Weighty authority so states, thus applying Wiener to the FCC and the
FPC 8  It can be doubted, however, whether the rule stemming from a
case where "Congress provided for a tenure defined by the relatively
short period of time during which the War Claims Commission was to
operate"2 could be applied to permanent agencies.
Justice Frankfurter, speaking for a unanimous Court, makes one
thing clear: the quasi-judicial independence of an agency, which pre-
cludes presidential removal, is a purely statutory matter. Congress could
have either validly chosen to vest the War Claims Commission's func-
tions in the Federal Security Administrator, "indubitably an arm of the
President," as was originally planned,"0 or it could have created a com-
mission whose members were to serve at the President's pleasure. 1
In other words, an agency may decide cases and it may have to fol-
low a quasi-judicial procedure in so deciding, but it need not be an inde-
pendent agency within the meaning of Humphrey and Wiener. Thus the
Attorney General, the Postmaster General, the Secretary of Agriculture,
the Federal Security Administrator-to name but a few examples-are
required to employ court-like procedures in certain cases,3" just as much
26. Id. at 350; War Claims Act of 1948 §3, 62 Stat. 1241 (1948), 50 U.S.C. App.
§ 2002 (1958).
27. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 350 (1958).
28. 1 DAis, AD MNISTRATmnV LAW TREATISE 22, n.18 (1958).
29. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 352 (1958).
30. Id. at 354.
31. Brown, The Supreme Court, i957 Term, 72 H- v. L. REv. 77, 165-66 (1958).
32. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955) (Attorney General must accord due
process to deportee even though APA's hearing provisions do not apply); Reilly v.
Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269 (1949), (Postmaster General's mail fraud order must be based up-
on due process including the right to cross examine experts) ; Morgan v. United States,
298 U.S. 468 (1936) (full hearing to precede rate making under Packers and Stockyards
Act, 42 Stat. 166 (1921), 7 U.S.C. § 211 (1958)) ; Ferenz v. Folsom, 237 F.2d 46 (3d
Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 10006 (1957) (typical quasi-judicial procedure before
Secretary of Health, Welfare and Education under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 405 (1958)).
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as, say, the NLRB, the FTC or the late War Claims Commission. Yet
the former are not, whereas the latter are "independent" agencies whose
heads have job security. This, of course diminishes the importance of
the Wiener rule: the party claimant or respondent is not constitutionally
protected against a congressional choice of this or that type of agency.
He is merely protected against presidential, political interference if Con-
gress has chosen an independent agency for the adjudication of his right.
If, contrary to the above interpretation, the Wiener holding extends
to every adjudicatory agency whose head and members have no statu-
torily limited tenure, what, then is the differentia specifica against "purely
executive" agencies, such as the Postmaster General or the Attorney Gen-
eral, who, as we have seen, must adjudicate rights "according to law" just
as much as their independent brethren? Why could the latter but not the
former be removed despite their quasi-judicial functions? It has been
suggested that the distinction depends on the relative proportion of the
agency's adjudicatory work load: if it constituted only a "relatively in-
significant portion" of the agency's work, the agency heads would not
enjoy the benefit of the Wiener decision.3 That could lead to nice ques-
tions. Surely, it cannot be denied that the rendition of a quasi-judicial
social security decision" constitutes something more than an insignificant
portion of the workload of the Department of Health, Welfare, and Edu-
cation. Yet it can hardly be doubted that its chief was not meant to fall
within the Wiener rule.35
The holding in Humphrey is rationalized also upon the fact that the
FTC acted "in part quasi-legislatively" in addition to acting quasi-
judicially." This is not mere dictum; it applied to the late Mr. Hum-
phrey as well as any other Federal Trade Commissioner. Thus, if the
Wiener rule must be applied not only where an agency is inherently short-
lived, like the War Claims Commission, but also where it is of an in-
definite duration, like the FPC, it would make apparently no difference
that a large or maybe the major portion of the agency's work consists of
rule making rather than decision making. Professor Davis's suggestion
that Wiener "does not necessarily reach such an agency as the SEC,
whose functions are not only quasi-judicial . . .," would be persuasive
33. Brown, The Supreme Court, 1957 Term, 72 HARv. L. REv. 77, 166 (1958). See
also 1 DAVIS, ADMINiSTRATIVE LAW TREATISE 22, n.18 (1958) (Wiener decision, note 29
supra, "does not necessarily include such an agency as the SEC, whose functions are not
only quasi judicial . . .").
34. E.g., Ferenz v. Folsom, note 32 supra.
35. Wiener v. United States, 357 U. S. 349 (1958).
36. Text accompanying note 23 supra.
37. See note 28 supra.
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only if the SEC's work was not to a large extent quasi-legislative. An
article by the Solicitor of this agency seems to prove the contrary."3
Moreover and most important, the rationale that demands judicial
independence does not apply to the legislature. Judges who try individual
cases involving a defendant's or accused's life, liberty or property must,
by our standards of justice, be removed from outside influence; and this
should be true of (administrative) quasi-judges, too. However, this cer-
tainly is not and never was true of legislators, who have always been sub-
jected to the influence of all sorts of extraneous sources, be it the White
House or lobbyists' groups. It is difficult to see why an agency about to
be engaged in the enactment of a regulation, i.e., in "quasi-lawmaking,"
should not listen to the advice or protestations of this or that group of
parties interested.89
There are "purely executive" officials (that is, those whose duties
are neither adjudicatory nor rule making) who have statutory terms, like
certain postmasters,"' U. S. Marshals," or-to mention an agency head-
TVA directors." No answer can be gleaned from the Myers"1 decision
as to whether such officials are freely removable despite their statutory
tenure. That case involved the presidential removal of a postmaster of the
first class whose term was to last four years pursuant to the following stat-
ute: "Postmasters of the first . . .class shall be appointed by the Presi-
dent . . .by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall hold
their offices for four years unless sooner removed or suspended accord-
ing to law. . . . "I' (Italics supplied.) The true issue was not "the Pres-
ident's inherent power to remove a postmaster, obviously an executive
official," as Justice Frankfurter's dictum in the Wiener case seems to
suggest." Rather, it presented the question of the validity of a statute
forbidding the removal of first class postmasters without the consent of
the Senate. That Mr. Myers could be removed at all prior to the expira-
38. Foster, Application of the Administrative Procedure Act to the Statutes Ad-
ministered by the Securities and Exchange Commission, in THE FEDERAL ADmINISTRATIVE
PROCEDURE AcT AND THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 213 (1947). See also Timbers and
Garfinkel, Examination of the Commission's Adjudicatory Process: Some Suggestions,
45 VA. L. REv. 817 (1959).
39. For two excellent writings exploding the myth that regulation-making agencies
should live in an ivory tower, see Armstrong, Book Review, 14 READING GUIDE, June
1959, p. 46 (U. of Va. L. School) ; Armstrong, Congress and the Securities and Exchange
Commission, 45 VA. L. REv. 795 (1959). And see Note, Ex Parte Contacts With the
Federal Communications Commission, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1178 (1960).
40. 39 U.S.C. § 31 (1958) (four years unless sooner removed).
41. 28 U.S.C. § 541 (c) (1958) (four years).
42. 16 U.S.C. § 831a (a) (1958) (nine years).
43. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
44. See note 40 supra.
45. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 351 (1958).
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tion of four years was not disputed, because the above-quoted statute
expressly so ordained ;4 and the Court decided merely that a senatorial
consent requirement would be unconstitutional. In other words, dictum
going beyond this notwithstanding, Mr. Myers had had no true statutory
tenure but merely a maximum term.
Morgan v. TVA,4  however, went farther. Here the statute gave
TVA members, such as the plaintiff, a nine-year term of office;48 and it
provided for two methods of removal: one by concurrent resolution of
both houses of Congress and the other by the President for cause (namely,
for injecting political considerations in appointing or promoting sub-
ordinates) ." The plaintiff was removed by the President "for stated
cause" but concededly not "for any specific ground laid down in the
statute."50 The appellate court ruled that the TVA board members being
executive officials did not fall under Humphrey,"' but that yet the TVA
Act did not so expressly curtail the President's "inherent" removal power
as to make it necessary to determine whether such a curtailment could
be constitutionally enacted. 2 In short, the statute did not expressly say
that TVA directors may not be removed for other reasons than the one
stated in the law, and the court refused to apply the maxim expressio
unius est exciusio alterius. A weak support for this reasoning could be
adduced from the fact that the statute made the removal for the one
specifically stated cause mandatory ("shall be removed")" whereas it
said nothing about possible discretionary removals. This reasoning
amounts to an unconvincing tour de force. In any case it does not answer
the question whether Congress may by express language make an execu-
tive officer irremovable during good behavior.
Neither Humphrey4 nor Wiener" actually prevented the President
from removing even a quasi-judicial officer. Rather, these cases merely
rendered the Government liable for the official's unpaid salary under the
general rules of damages. These rules include, it would seem, the rule
of avoidable consequences, whereby a plaintiff is not entitled to lost
wages if he earned or could have earned the equivalent amount else-
46. Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 107-108 (1926).
47. 115 F.2d 990 (6th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 701 (1941).
48. See note 42 supra.
49. 16 U.S.C. §§ 8 3 1c (f), 831e (1959).
50. Mforgan v. TVA, 28 F. Supp. 732, 733 (E. D. Tenn. 1939), aff'd 115 F. 2d 990
(6th Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 701 (1941).
51. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
52. Morgan v. TVA, note 50 supra.
53. 16 U.S.C. § 831e (1959).
54. See note 51 supra.
55. See note 35 supra.
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where. High ranking Government officials usually have no difficulty
in finding another equally lucrative position. And so the amount re-
coverable, if any, for a wrongfully ousted official may amount to a
mere trifle rather than serve as a deterrent for the administration to in-
terfere with independent agencies."
The recent case of Vitarelli v. Seaton," on the other hand, holds a
wrongfully dismissed Government employee "entitled to the reinstate-
ment which he seeks" in his injunction suit."8 If this means what it says,
then it should be likewise applicable to officers of cabinet rank and heads
of agencies.
According to the Administrative Procedure Act § 11, trial exam-
iners are "removable by the agency in which they are employed only for
good cause established and determined by the Civil Service Commis-
sion . . ." ; 9 and § 5, first sentence, makes it clear that the presence of
a good cause for a trial examiner's removal must be determined in a
quasi-judicial hearing."0
Trial examiners may conduct hearings, whenever (a) neither the
agency itself nor one of its members presides at the hearing and (b) the
enabling statute, as judicially construed, requires that a case be deter-
mined "on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing,"'" in
other words, when a quasi-judicial hearing is necessary, 2 quite regard-
less of whether the agency itself may be regarded as "quasi-judicial" and
"independent" or not. Thus the Postmaster General is an old-line cabi-
net member removable at the President's pleasure; but his subordinate
trial examiner, who hears mail fraud or obscenity cases, 3 is irremovable
and hence independent nearly like a judge. The trial examiner's inde-
pendence is, as matter of fact, enhanced by the fact that his superior-
the agency-may not lightly overrule his findings but rather must accord
them great weight.64  This situation-the existence of the independent
56. Mr. Humphrey was dead at the time of the lawsuit. Humphrey case, note 51
supra. Mr. Wiener had first brought a quo warranto proceeding, which, however, was
dismissed as moot by stipulation of the parties. Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349,
351 n. 1 (1958).
57. 359 U.S. 535 (1959).
58. Id. at 546.
59. 60 Stat. 244 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1010 (1958).
60. 60 Stat. 239 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1004 (1958) (Government officials "other than
examiners appointed pursuant to section 11" are not entitled to due process hearings in
matters involving their tenure of office).
61. Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33 (1950) ; APA § 7 (a) (3), 60 Stat.
241 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1006 (a) (3) (1958).
62. But see Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955) (statute may exempt agency
from trial examiner requirement).
63. E.g., Grove Press, Inc. v. Christenberry, 175 F. Supp 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1959),
73 HARv. L. REv. 583 (1960) ; Greene v. Kern, 178 F. Supp 201 (D.NJ. 1959).
64. Universal Camera Co. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474, 496 (1951); Continental Can
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quasi-judge within the not independent agency-shows most clearly the
vagueness of the conception "independent agency."
We may summarize the preceding points by saying that, while
judges are constitutionally independent,"5 agencies are not. Some agen-
cies, however, have been statutorily endowed with independence in the
sense that their members are removable only for cause. The validity of
such statutory grants has been upheld in cases where the agency was,
at least "largely," engaged in court-like ("quasi-judicial") procedures;
but it has been doubted where the agency's task was devoted to "purely
administrative" rather than quasi-judicial tasks. Even non-independent
agencies, however, whose heads are freely removable, may have trial
examiners to fulfill the agency's quasi-judicial functions (if the agency
has any) on the trial level. These trial examiners are statutorily ir-
removable.66
Little remains to be said concerning the term-a term rather than
a concept--"regulatory agency," which is used by many authors. If the
phrase is to embrace any agency that "regulates" anything, it is inher-
ently meaningless, for it would describe an attribute common to all gov-
ernmental authorities. If it means an agency that issues regulations
(rules), the term is not very significant either, for there is hardly any
administrative agency that has not at least the authority to make pro-
cedural rules,"7 quite apart from the fact that important "regulatory"
measures may under our system of law be taken by rule of individual
decision.68 Most of the federal agencies' actions tend to affect "busi-
ness" or "business and labor," wherefore a designation of some agencies
but of not of others as "regulatory" in this sense is likewise multifarious
and hence useless. An equation, finally, of "regulatory" with "independ-
ent" agency" is nonsensical because, as we have seen, not only is the
term "independent agency" vague and of little usefulness, but also would
it include, for instance, the Tax Court or the above-discussed War Claims
Commission, which to call "regulatory" would divest that word of its
immanent connotation as a simile to "policy making." This, however,
does not mean that it is suggested to use the word "regulatory" to de-
Co. v. United States, 272 F.2d 312, 316 (2d Cir. 1959).
65. U.S. CONsT. art III, § 1.
66. Though not as a matter of constitutional law. See note 62 szpra.
67. 1 Stat. 28 (1789), 5 U.S.C. § 22 (1958).
68. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947) ; NLRA § 14 (c) (1), as amended,
73 Stat. 541 (1959), 29 U.S.C.A. § 164 (c) (1) (NLRB may "by rule of decision or
by published rules . . ." decline to assert jurisdiction).
69. E.g., FORKOSCH, A TREATISE ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAw 10-12 (1956); LOEWEN-
STEIN, VERFASSUNGSRECHT UND VERFASSUNGSPRAXIS DER VEREINIGTEN STAATEN 245,
356 (1959).
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scribe policy making agencies, inasmuch as this would include more than
ninety per cent of all the agencies. Rather, the term should be discarded
altogether.
Lastly, there are authorities that are not agencies in the popular
meaning of the word but rather bureaus within other agencies, such as
the Director of Internal Revenue in the Treasury Department, the FBI
in the Department of Justice, the Bureau of Land Management in the
Department of the Interior, or the Wage and Hour Division in the De-
partment of Labor. Whether these bureaus are "agencies" within the
meaning of a given statute must be determined in the light of that
statute. The Administrative Procedure Act in § 2 (a) treats them as
agencies for the purposes of that act whenever they are vested with final
authority under a given set of laws"0 as, e.g., the Administrator of the
Wage and Hour Division under the FLSA7  or the Bureau of Land
Management under a presidential Reorganization Plan." Here again the
independence of these semi-agencies is a mere comparative one, in that it
rests on the width of discretion they have in administering the law and
the mode of appointment and tenure of their heads.
CONCLUSION
The founding fathers no doubt conceived the administrative-
executive branch of the federal government as a monolithic pyramidal
structure with the chief executive at the apex. History developed other-
wise, however. The administrative and executive branch of the govern-
ment is divided into agencies of different size and functions. Some of
them are politically tied to the President's will. Others are independent
from the President to a varying degree. All agencies enjoy the right to
regulate their own procedure and many of them are engaged in quasi-
legislative tasks embracing all walks of life. Many agencies that are
engaged in individual decision making must follow a formalized quasi-
judicial procedure. Some of the agencies performing quasi-judicial tasks
are fairly independent from the President while many others are either
old-line agencies (Cabinet members) or agencies within agencies. More-
over, the hearing of quasi-judicial cases is regularly assigned to trial ex-
aminers whose statutory independence is greater than that of their-"in-
dependent" or "non-independent"-agency heads.
70. "'Agency' means each authority (whether or not within or subject to review
by another agency) of the Government of the United States . . ." APA § 2 (a), 60
Stat. 237 (1946), 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (a) (1958).
71. FLSA § 4 (a), 52 Stat. 1061 (1938), 29 U.S.C. 204 (a) (1958).
72. 1946 Reorg. Plan No. 3 § 403 (b), 60 Stat. 1100 (1946), 11 Fed. Reg. 7876
(1946).
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In other words, our administrative system has grown without a
centralized plan but rather individually to fit the needs of this or that
type of agency.
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